Motivation
The recent currency crises in East Asia, Russia, and Latin America have stimulated the research on the causes of currency crises. On the one hand, it is increasingly common to hear assertions that the so-called crony capitalism may be partly responsible for the onset and/or the depth of the crises. [There is virtually no systematic evidence on this so far, one way or the other.
1 ] On the other hand, many researchers argue that the (fragile) self-fulfilling expectations by international creditors are the real reason for the currency crisis. Crony capitalism and self-fulfilling expectations are typically presented as rival explanations.
There may be a linkage between the two explanations. This paper investigates a particular channel through which crony capitalism increases the chance of a future currency crisis driven by self-fulfilling expectations. Specifically, the extent of corruption in a country may affect that country's composition of capital inflows in a way that makes it more vulnerable to international creditors' shifts in their self-fulfilling expectations. Corruption here refers to the extent to which firms (or private citizens) need to pay bribes to government officials in their interactions (for permits, licenses, loans, and so forth).
2
Several studies (starting with Frankel and Rose 1996, followed by Radlet and Sachs 1998, and Rodrik and Velasco 1999) have shown that the composition of international capital inflows is correlated with incidence of currency crises. In particular, the lower the share of foreign direct investment in total capital inflow, or the higher the short-term debt to reserve ratio, the more likely a country may run into a currency crisis.
One possible reason for this is that bank lending or other portfolio investment may be more sentiment-driven than direct investment. Hence, a small (unfavorable) change in the recipient countries' fundamentals may cause a large swing in the portfolio capitals (e.g., from massive inflows to massive outflows). This can strain the recipient country's currency or financial system sufficiently to cause or exacerbate its collapse (Radelet and Sachs 1998 , Rodrik and Velasco 1999 , and Reisen 1999 .
To see the differences in the volatility of various types of capital flows, we compute the standard deviations of three ratios (portfolio capital inflow/GDP, borrowingfrom-banks/GDP, and inward FDI/GDP) during 1980-96 for every member country of the IMF for which data on all three variables are available. Table 1 presents a summary of the results. We see that for the subset of OECD countries (with membership up to 1980), the volatility of FDI/GDP ratio is substantially smaller than the other two ratios.
For non-OECD countries as a group, the FDI/GDP ratio is also much less volatile than the loan/GDP ratio, although it is higher than the portfolio flow/GDP ratio. The lower part of the same table presents the volatility of the three ratios for a number of individual countries that featured prominently in the recent currency crises. Each country shows a loan/GDP ratio that is at least twice and as much as fifteen times as volatile as the FDI/GDP ratio. For each of these countries, the portfolio capital/GDP ratio is also more volatile than the FDI/GDP ratio. If we extend the sample period to include the last two years, the differences in volatility would be even more pronounced (not reported).
Therefore, the data is consistent with the hypothesis that FDI is less sentiment-driven and hence more stable as a source of foreign capital.
This paper studies the connection between the degree of corruption in capitalreceiving countries and the composition of capital flows into these countries. In particular, we focus on the size of bilateral direct investment versus that of bilateral bank lending from 13 developed countries to 30 developing and transition economies. [As we
are not able to obtain data on non-bank portfolio investment on a bilateral basis, we leave them out of this examination.]
Corruption is bad for both international direct investors and creditors. Corrupt borrowing countries are more likely to default on bank loans, or to nationalize (or otherwise diminish the value of) the assets of foreign direct investors. When this happens, there is a limit on how much international arbitration or court proceedings can help to recover the assets, as there is a limit on how much collateral the foreign creditors or direct investors can seize as compensation. Pill (1996 and argue that the government guarantee generates "moral hazard" which in turn leads the developing countries to "overborrow" from the international credit market.
of capital inflows, would we still find the positive association between corruption and the loan/FDI ratio?
We organize the rest of the paper in the following way. Section 2 presents a simple model that shows how corruption may affect the composition of capital flows.
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the methodology and the statistical results of the analyses. And Section 5 concludes.
A Minimalist Model
In this section, a simple two-period model is used to demonstrate how corruption in a country may affect the composition of its capital flows. For simplicity, let us consider that there are two types of international capital flows: direct investment and bank credit.
Let us suppose that the government in the capital-importing country, k, maximizes the following two-period objective function:
where G(k, 1) and G(k, 2) are expenditures by the government in country k in Period 1
and Period 2, respectively, and δ is the subjective discount factor. For simplicity, we assume that the tax revenues in the two periods, T(k, 1) and T(k, 2), are exogenously given. Let B(k) and D(k) are first-period borrowing by country k from international banks and first-period direct investment in country k, respectively. To abstract from unnecessary complications, we assume that bank credit and FDI are merely two forms of additional funding sources. No production is explicitly modeled. In this case, the gap between the first-period expenditure and tax revenue has to be met by the inflow of international capital:
In the second period, the international credit has to be repaid. Moreover, international direct investors are assumed to recoup both the investment and the gross profit.
where R[B(k)] and R[D(k)] are the gross returns that international creditors and international director investors would demand from country k. Suppose R* is the gross return on the risk free bond (say, the U.S. government bond as an approximation), then, we assume that
Both θ and ρ(k) are positive. ρ(k) should be thought of proportional to country k's perceived level of corruption. The positive θ reflects the assumption that the warranted returns on either bank credit or direct investment increases with the size of the capital inflow. ρ(k) appears in the return on the direct investment but not in that on bank credit because corruption represents a greater risk to direct investment than to bank loans (for the two reasons described in the previous section).
A few points are worth noting here. First, we assume that the bank credit is obtained and later paid back by the government. Borrowing from international credit market in reality can be done by either private or public sector. Many researchers have observed that the distinction between private and public borrowing is very thin since private borrowing from the international credit market often carries implicit and sometimes explicit guarantee from the government of the borrowing country. Second, while direct investment is supposed to be for the "long term," investors eventually would want to recoup both the initial investment and the cumulative profits along the way.
The government's maximization problem yields the following two first-order conditions:
This implies a particular relationship between the composition of capital inflow for country k and its corruption level:
Hence, the higher is the corruption level in country k, the less FDI it would receive relative to its bank borrowing. While this model is very simple and perhaps overly simplistic, it does capture the basic message relatively well.
Data
The key components of international capital flows in the empirical investigation are bilateral direct investment and bilateral bank loans. As far as we know, other forms of capital flows are not available on a bilateral basis for a broad set of capital-exporting countries examined in this paper.
The bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) data is an average over three years of the stock of foreign direct investment from 13 source countries to 30 host countries. Table 3 For relative extent of corruption across countries, we employ three different measures. The first, which we label as the TI Index, is published by Transparency
International, a Germany-based international non-governmental organization devoted to fight corruption worldwide. The TI index itself is a weighted average of twelve separate sources ranging from 1996-98. 6 The TI index ranks the extent of corruption on a zero-toten scale.
As a survey of surveys, the TI corruption index has its advantages and disadvantages. If the measurement errors in each of its component surveys are independent and identically distributed (iid), the averaging process used to produce the TI index reduces the measurement error. On the other hand, the iid assumption may not hold. Moreover, since each component of the TI index could have different country coverage and employ different definitions of corruption, the averaging process could introduce new measurement errors when cross-country ratings are produced.
The second corruption measure, the GCR Index, is derived from the Global The third corruption measure, labeled as the WDR Index, is derived from a World Bank survey in 1996 of 3866 firms in 73 countries in preparation for its World Development Report 1997. Question 14 of that survey asks: "Is it common for firms in my line of business to have to pay some irregular, "additional" payments to get things done?" The respondents were asked to rate the level of corruption on a one-to-six scale.
The WDR corruption index is based on the country average of the individual answers.
For the three corruption indexes, the original sources are such that a higher number implies lower corruption. To avoid awkwardness in interpretation, they are rescaled in this paper so that a high number now implies high corruption. Table 4 presents pair-wise correlation coefficients for the three corruption measures (as well their correlations with per capita GDP). In spite of the different sources and methodologies, the three corruption measures are fairly highly correlated with each other, suggesting sufficient consistency in the perception of relative corruption levels across countries.
We have employed other variables in the statistical analyses. For details of the data construction and their sources, please see Appendix A.
Statistical Analyses

Bilateral Foreign Direct Investment
We start with an analysis of the relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment. Let FDI j k denote bilateral foreign direct investment from source country j to host country k. We adopt a generalized gravity specification: source country Log(FDI j k ) = fixed effects + β corruption k + X j k Γ + e j k Where β and Γ are scalar and vector parameters, respectively, and X j k is a vector of determinants of bilateral FDI other than host country corruption. Specifically,
Finally, e j k is assumed to be an iid normally distributed variate with a zero mean.
The regression result is presented as column 1 in table 5a. We observe that the coefficients on the control variables are of sensible signs. Larger host economies tend to receive more FDI. Host countries that are closer to source countries either in physical proximity or in linguistic/historical connection also receive more FDI. Most importantly for our question, countries that are more corrupt tend to receive less foreign direct investment. This FDI-depressing effect of corruption is significant not only statistically (at the 5 percent level) but also economically. A one-step increase in the TI corruption rating is associated with a 20 percent reduction in inward FDI. An increase in local corruption from the Singapore level (TI-index value of 0.9) to the level of Mexico (TIindex value of 6.7) is associated with a reduction in inward FDI by 68 percent.
7
So far, we have assumed that the error term in the regression is independently distributed across observations. If there are other host country characteristics that are important for FDI but omitted from the current specification, it could induce correlation in the error terms (over observations for a common host country). To investigate the effect of this type of omitted variables, we also implement a type of random effects specification which differs from the previous fixed-effects regression by allowing a hostcountry specific component in the error term. That is, source country Log(FDI j k ) = fixed effects + β corruption k + X j k Γ + u k + e j k where u k is host-specific normal variate with zero mean, e j k is the same as before (iid across all observations), and u k and e j k are uncorrelated from each other.
The result of this random-effects regression is reported as column 2 in table 5a.
The qualitative results of all coefficients remain the same as before. The effect of corruption on FDI remains negative and statistically significant. If anything, the point estimate of the effect has become even larger.
7 exp{-0.199 X (6.7-0.9)} -1 = -0.68.
Since the corruption rating that we have used is based on subjective survey responses, it is useful to check for robustness of our finding by using alternative corruption ratings. Specifically, we replicate our key regressions by replacing the TI corruption rating with the ratings from the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) and World Development Report (WDR), respectively. Unlike a typical component of the TI rating, which is based on a survey of (a single) expert, both GCR and WDR ratings are derived by averaging over individual responses in large firm-level surveys.
The regression results are reported as columns 3-6 in table 5a. The most important observation to make is that corruption depresses FDI no matter which measure of corruption is used. In three out of four regressions, the coefficient on corruption is negative and statistically significant. The remaining insignificant coefficient still has a negative sign and an economically big coefficient.
When we use log(FDI) as the dependent variable, those bilateral FDI observations that are zero are dropped from the regressions. To see if our result is qualitatively affected by including zero-FDI observations, we also use log(FDI+0.1) as the dependent variable and replicate all the previous regressions. The results are reported as table 5b.
Overall, the results in this new specification (with slightly more observations) are very similar to before.
Bilateral Bank Loans
We now proceed to examine the connection between corruption level in a developing country and its borrowing from the industrial countries. For easy comparison with the results on FDI, we start with a generalized gravity specification with source country fixed effects like before: source country Log(Loan j k ) = fixed effects + β corruption k + X j k Γ + e j k where Loan j k is the bilateral loan from lending country j to borrowing country k. β and Γ are scalar and vector parameters, respectively. And X j k is a vector of determinants of bilateral loans other than host country corruption. The regression result is reported as column 1 in table 6a. In contrast to the earlier result on FDI (which is discouraged by host country corruption), the coefficient on corruption in this regression is not statistically different from zero. Thus, a corrupt country experiences no apparent disadvantage in terms of securing bank loans from developed countries.
Similar to our discussion on FDI, we proceed to run an alternative (randomeffects) specification that allows part of the error term to be host-country specific:
source country Log(Loan j k ) = fixed effects + β corruption k + X j k Γ + u k + e j k where u k is host-specific normal variate with zero mean, e j k is the same as before (iid across all observations), and u k and e j k are uncorrelated to each other. The result is reported as column 2 in table 6a. The coefficient estimates are qualitatively similar to those from the fixed-effects regression. In particular, the coefficient on corruption remains indifferent from zero even at the 15 percent level.
As a robustness check, we replicate the above fixed-effects and random-effects regressions using the two alternative measures of corruption, namely, the GCR and WDR indexes. The regression results are reported in the last four columns of table 6a. As it turns out, the sign of the coefficient on corruption is sensitive to the choice of corruption measure. When the GCR index is employed, more corrupt countries on average attract more bank loans from developed countries than otherwise identical borrowing countries. This is true for both fixed-and random-effects specifications. When the WDR index is employed, the effect of corruption on loans is either zero (in the case of a fixed-effects regression) or negative (in the case of a random-effects regression). The pair-wise correlation coefficients among the three measures of corruption are high (see table 4 ).
Scatter plots of one corruption measure against another do not reveal any obvious outliers either. So we do not have an intuitive explanation for why the three different corruption measures produce different results. 
Ratio of bank loans to FDI
The central question of the paper is whether corruption affects the composition of capital inflows. So we now examine whether the ratio of bank loans to FDI is affected by local corruption.
We proceed as before starting with a fixed-effects regression using the TI-index as the measure of corruption:
source country Log(Loan j k / FDI j k ) = fixed effects + β corruption k + X j k Γ + e j k
The regression result is reported in column 1 in table 7a. As expected, the coefficient on corruption is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Hence, a corrupt country tends to have a composition of capital inflows that is relatively light in FDI and relatively heavy in bank loans.
Also note that because FDI is more relationship-intensive (as proxied by physical and linguistic distances) than bank loans, the coefficients on geographic distance and the linguistic tie dummy are positive and negative, respectively, in this regression which examines the determinants of the loan-to-FDI ratio.
We proceed with a slew of robustness checks employing alternative measures of corruption (GCR and WDR) and alternative specification (i.e., random-effects). The results are reported in the last five columns of tables 7a and 7b. The qualitative results are similar. In particular, the coefficient estimate on the corruption variable in each of the six regressions is positive and statistically significant. Hence, the evidence is overwhelming and robust that corrupt countries tend to have a particular structure of capital inflows characterized by a relatively light foreign direct investment.
Instrumental Variable Regressions
One might be concerned with endogeneity of the corruption measure. For example, if survey respondents may perceive a country to be corrupt in part because they observe very little FDI going there. In this case, the negative association between the FDI-to-loan ratio and corruption is due to the reverse causality. This is of a particular concern here since our reliable measures of corruption were derived in 1996 or later, whereas the most recent FDI and loan data (on a bilateral basis) are from 1996 or earlier.
In this subsection, we perform instrumental variable (IV) regressions on our key regressions. Mauro (1995) argued that ethnolinguistic fragmentation is a good IV for corruption. His ethnolinguistic indicator measures the probability that two persons from a country are from two distinct ethnic groups. The greater the indicator, the more fragmented the country. Table 8a reports the regressions of our corruption measures on a constant (not reported) and the same measure of ethnolinguistic fragmentation as Mauro.
The slope coefficient is positive and statistically significant: the greater the heterogeneity in the population, the greater the corruption on average.
In table 8b, we add one more regressor, namely, the extent of democracy. This variable is also statistically significant. More democracy means less corruption. The reason seems intuitive. More democracy means more accountability (either through check-and-balances across different branches of government, or through greater responsiveness of the government to people, or both). And more accountability implies less corruption. It is interesting to observe that once one controls for democracy, the ethnolinguistic fragmentation variable is no longer statistically significant.
In table 9, we re-do some of the key regressions in tables 5-7 using the fitted value of regression (1) in table 8b as the instrumented value of corruption. 8 Now there is some weak evidence that corrupt countries may also receive less bank loans (columns 1 and 2). They still receive significantly less FDI (columns 3-4). Most importantly, because corruption deters FDI more than bank loans, countries that are more corrupt tend to have a capital inflow structure that relies relatively more on bank borrowing and less on FDI.
Portfolio and Direct Investments from the United States
While bilateral data on portfolio investment other than bank credits are not available for the whole set of capital-exporting countries examined in the previous subsections, we can obtain data on portfolio investment from the United States (to a set of developing countries). In this subsection, we use the data on United States outward capital flows to examine whether the portfolio-to-direct investment ratio in a capitalreceiving country is affected by its corruption level.
We again perform fixed-effects and random-effects regressions pruning the relationship between portfolio-investment-to FDI ratio. The results are reported in table 10. We see again that, at least for this sub-sample, the portfolio-investment-to-FDI ratio is also positively related to the capital-importing country's corruption level. The corrupt a country is, the less FDI it tends to receive relative to portfolio capital.
Conclusions
Corrupt countries receive less foreign direct investment. On the other hand, corrupt countries may not be disadvantaged in obtaining bank loans (or at least not by as much). As a result, corruption in a capital-importing country tends to tilt the composition of its capital inflows away from foreign direct investment and towards foreign bank loans. The data supports this hypothesis. Furthermore, the effect of corruption on the ratio of borrowing from foreign banks to inward FDI is robust across different measures of corruption and different econometric specifications.
There are two possible reasons for this effect. First, foreign direct investments are more likely to be exploited by local corrupt officials ex post than foreign loans. As a result, fewer FDI would go to a corrupt countries ex ante. Second, the current international financial architecture is such that there is more insurance/protection from the IMF and the G7 governments for bank lenders from developed countries than for direct investors.
Previous research (starting with Frankel and Rose 1996) has shown that a capital inflow structure that is relatively low in FDI is associated with a greater propensity for future currency crisis. It may be that international bank loans (or other portfolio flows)
swing more than direct investment in the event of a bad news (real, or self-generated by the international investors) about economic or policy fundamentals. If so, this paper has provided evidence for one possible channel through which corruption in a developing country may increase its chances of running into a future crisis.
In the literature on the causes of currency crises, crony capitalism and selffulfilling expectations by international creditors are often proposed as two rival hypotheses. Indeed, authors that subscribe to one view often do not accept the other.
The evidence in this paper suggests a natural linkage between the two. Crony capitalism, through its effect on the composition of a country's capital inflows, make it more vulnerable to self-fulfilling expectations type of currency crisis.
Corruption could also lead to a financial crisis by weakening domestic financial supervision and producing a deteriorated quality of banks' and firms' balance sheets.
This possibility itself can be a topic for a useful research project.
instruments. 
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Corruption -GCR Index
Original source: Global Competitiveness Report 1997 Transformation: value in this paper = 8 -original values.
Corruption -WDR Index
Original source: survey for the 1997 World Development Report Transformation: value in this paper = 8 -original values. See: Kaufmann and Wei (1999) , "Does 'Grease Payment' Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce?" NBER Working Paper 7093.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and GDP Per Capita
Source: World Bank Sima/WDI99 Database GDP at market prices (constant 1995 US$). Log(GDP) calculated as Ln(GDP94 + GDP95 + GDP96)/3. Log(per capita GDP) calculated as Ln [(gdp94/pop94+gdp95/pop95+gdp06/pop96)/3]. Exceptions: two year average if the value for the third year is missing. 
